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THE SINGLE OWNER REVISITED: A BRIEF
REPLY TO PROFESSOR LEWIN
RiCFARD A. EPSTEIN
Professor Lewin's short comment on my lecture about regulation
and contract in environmental law raises, in thoughtful fashion, some
difficulties with my thesis. They deserve some brief comment in
reply. To set the stage, Lewin accepts my two initial premises for
dealing with environmental problems. First, that the appropriate level
of environmental harms should be determined with reference to a
hypothetical test that asks what level of pollution would be accepted
by a single owner of the entire world (or any isolated sub-system
thereof) who had to internalize all the gains and losses of his own
decisions. Second, that in a world with multiple actors, the trading
of rights to pollute is normally a good thing, so long as the rights
of third persons are not diminished by the exchange. The voluntary
exchange benefits both parties to it, while the protection of third-
party rights through coercive legal means insures that third-party
losses do not exceed the gains of the immediate parties to the trans-
action. Both of us recognize, indeed insist, that this system is not
foolproof. Mistakes can be made in the estimation of the meas-
urement of environmental losses and in the anticipated gains from
private exchange. But all rival systems of environmental control are
prey to these errors. The best we can hope for, therefore, is to create
a set of incentives to induce actors, both private and public, to seek
out the optimal solution.
Notwithstanding some broad areas of agreement, Lewin and I
part company over both theoretical and practical issues. At the the-
oretical level, he believes that I have chosen the wrong "single
owner," the large corporation which is risk neutral with respect to
environmental harms. He would choose a very different single owner,
the loving, risk-averse parent who cares deeply about the environ-
ment, her children, and her children's children; someone, in his
words, who worries about "the effects of acid rain and the hole in
the ozone (layer]" (p. 896). His view is that the difference in choice
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of the single owner will clearly influence the patterns of use and
consumption within the system. Where intangible benefits are given
pride of place, and where risk aversion is the dominant position,
we should not expect otherwise. The identity of the single owner
therefore influences the mix of choices that will be made, within
the incentive structure that both Lewin and I believe is appropriate.
I cannot of course tell Professor Lewin who his preferred single
owner should be, but I can indicate briefly where I think his ap-
proach misfires. I do not think that the single owner should be the
risk-neutral corporation, or indeed any abstract entity at all. Cor-
porations are composed of shareholders, and no matter how many
corporate layers are interposed between ordinary human beings and
the assets that they control, it is the people and not "the" cor-
poration whose preferences and desires should control. My quarrel
with Lewin is his premise that it is possible to identify one person
who is the proper single owner; I am very much skeptical that this
can be achieved. I do not wish to give pride of place to persons
who share my own view about the appropriate tradeoff between
productive gains and environmental risks, but, by the same token,
I am leery in ceding that right to Lewin or any other person. Instead,
I believe we have to think of some composite person (that hypo-
thetical person behind the veil of ignorance), and, thus, look at some
version of the median person in order to make our global assess-
ment. We must seek some cross between the crass materialist and
the loving parent. With the increase in a standard of living, I suspect
that this person, however identified, will be willing to invest greater
sums in environmental protection than otherwise, given the reduced
cost of environmental improvements that comes with prosperity. It
is one thing to sacrifice aerosol deodorants to protect the ozone
layer. It is another thing to risk mass starvation because of the
failure to protect crops against destruction by pests. While we can
never be sure who the median person is, and what that person de-
sires, we can be sure that Professor Lewin's approach, which is to
take the single person most sympathetic to his own causes, is not
the correct methodological response to his own excellent query. Lewin
has thus pointed out an added and unavoidable difficulty that any
environmental program has to overcome, but his proposed solution
runs the risk of polarizing the response to the debate.
[Vol. 93
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Professor Lewin's second point builds on his first but has a more
practical bent. The source of difference between us is over two cur-
rent environmental programs that have generated a large amount of
political controversy: wetlands regulation and the approximate orig-
inal-contour requirements of the strip-mining statutes. Lewin is sym-
pathetic to both these programs, which allow the government to
impose regulation on private landowners without having to com-
pensate them in cash for the diminution in value that they suffer.
Part of our differences start from an issue so vast that it extends
far beyond the domain of environmental law. Lewin writes, "In my
view, private property is the creation of the government, and all
property is held subject to the right of government to impose rea-
sonable regulations to promote public health, safety, and welfare."
(p. 897). Lewin's view is at dramatic odds with that of the framers
who thought (1) that the institution of private property was prior
to and independent of government, and (2) that the justification for
the state was to protect both individual liberty and private property
as they knew it. This choice of baseline is not one of mere words:
if property begins with the state, then there is a heavy burden on
those who seek to privatize it; if property begins with the individual,
then the burden is placed on those who seek to regulate its use.
The question is how does one decide which baseline is appro-
priate for the analysis. The question is a complex one, and a full
discussion would take us far beyond the scope of my brief reply.
However, it is useful to give some clues to what I believe to be the
proper approach. No initial assignment of rights will place all re-
sources where they are most highly valued. Some subsequent re-
arrangements, whether through private transactions or public force,
will be required. The proper assignment of initial rights is that which
reduces the number of obstacles that have to be overcome before
that optimal assignment of rights is achieved. Where property is
thought to reside initially with the government, then the question
of subsequent transfer and redeployment is tied-up politics, faction,
and the standard conundrums of collective choice. The lamentable
collection of giveaway programs for federal-range lands, national
forests, and public water rights that Lewin rightly condemns (pp.
898-99) are illustrations of what can and will go wrong when val-
uable resources are subject to initial government ownership. A sys-
1991]
3
Epstein: The Single Owner Revisited: A Brief Reply to Professor Lewin
Published by The Re earch Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tern of private ownership would prevent the immense social losses
that follow when these resources are given to the politically well-
connected for a fraction of their market value. Where property rests
with individual owners, the political and transactional problems are
far less. Logging, grazing, and irrigation are done by competitive
bid so that resources are directed to their highest value. The failures
of socialism for natural resources are not simply fortuitous. So-
cialism fails for natural resources for the same reason that it fails
everywhere else. It rests on the fatal initial assumption that there
should be collective ownership over the means of production. What-
ever the imperfections of ordinary markets based on private own-
ership, they are dwarfed by the structural problems of centralized
planning.
There is, then, good reason to reject Lewin's basic proposition
as a general matter. The question is whether it can be sustained in
the more narrow area of environmental regulations. Here in defense
of that position, Lewin outlines some of the bargaining risks that
could emerge if the government were required to pay compensation
in order to impose wetland restrictions on certain lands, or to require
landowners to restore lands to their original contours. With respect
to the strip mining situation, Lewin asserts that landowners could
falsely claim that any minimal efforts at restoration are sufficient
to meet the standard of "safe state," and then use that claim to
hold up the state in its quest to impose more stringent regulations
(p. 898). That risk is certainly one that has to be taken into account
in any overall assessment of the situation, but, by the same token,
it also has to be placed in perspective.
Two points bear special note. First, there is, under the present
system, enormous pressures that prevent the mining of the coal in
the first place, and the occasional administrative exemptions for
'steep-slope' operators are (I am confident) rarely dispensed and
costly to obtain. There is, in other words, an endemic risk of ex-
cessive regulation when the power to regulate resides in one party
while the losses fall on a second. The separation between legal con-
trol and financial responsibility is as mischievous in the environ-
mental area as anywhere else. The problem is not only serious with
[Vol. 93
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strip mining, but is all pervasive with respect to wetlands, where the
government is willing to designate far too much land as wetlands,
including lands that are only marginally related to the original pro-
gram. The loss of valuable development rights does not enter into
the equation of those who obtain the benefit, psychic or otherwise,
of the wetlands designation.
Second, Lewin overlooks the other remedies that can be imposed
on landowners who make false claims that their property is in a
safe state. Most critical to this inquiry, it is possible to have private
damage actions, state fines or both, if land claimed to have been
restored to a safe condition in fact turns out to be dangerous. The
state could also impose insurance or other financial responsibility
obligations on the landowner to make sure that insolvency does not
defeat the force of the monetary remedy that it imposes. There might
also be a system of inspection to see that the restoration done does
not impose any risk of water or soil damage on other parties. Ex
post remedies can also be used along with the ex ante ones, and
one major mistake of present environmental policy is to place too
great a reliance on the public prohibition of certain courses of con-
duct. It is, in short, possible to devise remedial structures that ad-
dress the risks of external harms without imposing the heavy costs
of restoration to original contours. There is little reason to believe
that-these contours are required to control nuisance-like harms, and
no reason to believe that these are the restrictions that would be
insisted upon by any single owner, including Lewin's loving parent.
While Lewin claims that the original contour is a simple, bright-line
approximation to a "no environmental damage" standard (p. 898),
I believe that -the fit between these two is very bad indeed. A safe
state standard coupled with damage actions for actual violations is
a far better solution to the present system.
Finally, there is a larger point that links the theoretical with the
practical issue. Even persons who are risk averse with respect to
environmental losses have to respect the budget constraints. So long
as the loving parent is risk averse with respect to all environmental
hazards, then she should be willing to take money which is spent
on one environmental area and use it to control the abuses that lie
1991]
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in another. Where the choice is not between other goods and en-
vironmental protection, but different forms of environmental pro-
tection, risk aversion tends to drop out of the picture because it
does not give us any reason to prefer one environmental risk to
another. In general, I think that the risk averse person should have
this same level of priorities that is held by the median person, or
indeed someone who lies on the other side of the distribution. For
example, I think that the risk averse person should have far more
sympathy for the "live and let live" arguments than are typically
found today in the environmental movement with its excessive at-
traction to zero-risk (or near zero-risk standards). The major dif-
ference between risk averse and nonrisk averse persons should, in
principle, be resolved by a single variable: the size of the resource
budget that is devoted to protection against environmental losses.
Professor Lewin has, I believe, opted for a strategy that makes in-
efficient use of available resources to deal with environmental losses.
I think that he would be far more faithful to his own cause if he
adopted my general approach to wetlands and strip-mining and other
environmental problems, and then supported greater budgetary al-
location to environmental concerns relative to others. At that point
we can all face the truly difficult question of how to allocate our
expenditures for education, health, welfare, or environmental pro-
tection - a truly insoluble set of choices for both Lewin and myself.
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